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The Limits of Prognostication
Eric Chevlen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Medical statistics are, by definition, data concerning aggregates of people. Individual patients are, by definition, the opposite of aggregates. At first blush, then, it would seem unlikely
that medical statistics could be very accurate in predicting the
disease outcome in individual patients. Indeed, as will be shown
below, no clinical study demonstrates the ability of physicians to
precisely predict the survival outcome in individual cases in a
non-trivial way.' More importantly, the inability of physicians to
precisely predict outcome in individual cases is not simply a
shortcoming in practice that could be overcome with more sophisticated technology even in theory. Either human survival is
dependent to some extent on important random events, and is,
therefore, unpredictable, or it is completely determinative. Even
if it is completely determinative, however, the mathematics of
chaos theory almost surely govern it and make individual prognostication at best a probabilistic affair.
All of the above may be little more than truism and would be of
little social or medical import were it not for the effort of some
referenda, legislatures, and courts to legalize physician-assisted
suicide for, at least in the initial legislative iteration, terminally
ill people. These legal forays against 2400 years of medical ethics seek to cull out a class of citizens who would no longer be the
beneficiaries of state interest in maintaining their lives. Indeed,
legalized physician-assisted suicide would create a class of people
* Diplomate of the American Boards of Internal Medicine, Medical Oncology,
Hematology, and Pain Medicine; Director of Palliative Care at St. Elizabeth Health
Center, Youngstown, OH; Medical Director of Hospice of the Valley, Youngstown, OH;
Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine, Northeastern Ohio Universities College of
Medicine; M.D., Ohio State University, College of Medicine, Columbus, OH (1974); B.A.,
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH (1971).
1. Predictions such as "all patients with this disease will die within 120 years" are
mathematically precise but clinically trivial.
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who uniquely qualify for dispatching from this life with state
approval, and often at public expense.2
Under current law, state interest in maintaining life does not
depend on the health of the citizen. The state forbids homicide
and assisted suicide in healthy and sick alike. Legalization of
physician-assisted suicide would, however, create a critical juncture between terminally ill people and the non-terminally ill.
The latter would continue to be the object of state concern, but
the former, for the first time in our nation's history, would cease
to be so, at least as far as physician-assisted suicide is concerned.
Since legalized physician-assisted suicide makes such a critical
distinction, literally a life and death difference, to be dependent
on the terminal status of people, the proposed legislations must
define "terminally ill" with great legal precision. Moreover, this
precise legal construct must reflect an equally precise medical
one if it is not to be a completely arbitrary distinction.
In fact, however, the proposed legal standards of "terminally
ill" have not been formulated with the precision that such a distinction demands. Even worse, as far as the proponents of physician-assisted suicide are concerned, the medical reality that the
legal definition should reflect is anything but precise. The result
is that the legal attempt to base physician-assisted suicide on
accurate medical prognoses is unsuccessful in practice, impossible in theory, foolish at best, and wicked at worst.
II.

THE

ORIGIN AND USES OF MEDICAL STATISTICS

Medicine is a science because all human beings have the same
fundamental anatomy and physiology; in a phrase, because all
people are alike. Medicine is an art because in no two human
beings is this anatomy and physiology exactly the same; all people are different. The tension between these two opposites
necessitates that medicine be an artistic science and a scientific
art.
Throughout its struggling and often noble history, the goal of
medicine has been to relieve suffering and prolong lives.3 Rare
indeed is the disease or treatment whose outcome has been 100%
predictable. Doctors gathered data on outcomes of different
treatments, therefore, for the purpose of comparison. This was
not idle curiosity. The doctors wanted to apply the aggregate
2.

Were physician-assisted suicide legalized, it would be a defined part of medical

practice and therefore subject for reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid.
3. Proposals to legalize euthanasia, of course, are contrary to this tradition. They
are based on the false claim that relief of suffering can only be accomplished by ending
lives.
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data to individual cases, not (as in the current proposals) to
select patients for death, but rather to choose the treatment most
likely to benefit the patient. In recognition of the variability of
outcome, doctors developed risk factor analyses. By stratifying
the total population of study according to predetermined risk factors, the doctors could identify outcome according to subgroup.
In turn, this type of analysis would allow doctors to identify
patients for whom the standard therapy was unsatisfactory.
These patients, then, would become candidates for other therapies hypothesized to have a better risk to benefit ratio for the
subset.
It is important to recognize, then, that the development of outcome statistics and risk factor identification was always to refine
the treatment of future cases, never to select a set of patients to
be killed by doctors. From time to time, of course, the data were
used to identify patients whose prognosis was so poor even with
treatment as to lead the doctor to recommend no disease-specific
treatment at all.4 This was not because the doctor wanted the
patient to die; rather, it was the doctor's clinical judgment that
the likely burden of treatment exceeded its likely benefit. The
doctor did not choose to not treat the disease; instead, the doctor
recognized that it could not be treated. In cases where the treatment was unlikely to be beneficial, and even less likely to be burdensome, it was often tried. As would be expected from their
mathematical definition, such last-ditch efforts yielded rare
successes.
Survival prediction by diagnosis and other risk factors was, of
course, not completely accurate. This inaccuracy was not a
major problem, however, when the prognosis was used to select a
therapy. The physician's clinical duty was not to be a fortune
teller, but rather to do the best he or she could given the information at hand, and, as in the classic dictum, to do no harm. The
physician's ethical duties were parallel with clinical ones. Ethics
govern the intentions of our actions. Parallel with the clinical
duty to do good is the physician's ethical duty to intend to do
good. Corresponding to the clinical duty to do no harm is the
physician's ethical duty to intend no harm. While the nature of
the limits of medical therapeutics would often result in doctors
failing to achieve clinical goals, there has never been an apodictic
cause preventing doctors from achieving their ethical duties to
the patient.
4. Withholding of disease-specific treatment never precluded palliative care, of
course.
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MEDICAL STATISTICS AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

The proposal to legalize the physician-assisted suicide of terminally ill patients has introduced a new application to medical
survival statistics, an application completely at odds with the
purpose for which they were originally developed, and reflecting
an ethic completely at odds with the one which underlay their
original use. It will be no surprise, then, that the tool is ill-fitted
for this ill-meaning task.
We must ask, what will be the standard of accuracy of survival
data when applied to the dubious task of defining patients as
potential candidates for euthanasia? How good need our ability
to prognosticate be? In clinical practice, a modest margin of
error, although not desirable, is still acceptable since it does not
preclude our choosing therapies likely to yield the greatest good
for the individual at hand. When medical prognoses are used to
select candidates for physician-assisted suicide, however, the
standard of accuracy must be quite higher. Since the prognosis
will be used by the state to assign individuals to different categories of state interest in preservation of life, the accuracy of the
prognosis must be very good indeed. How good is very good?
Clearly, being wrong half the time is not good enough. Being
wrong even 10% of the time is a standard that the law would not
accept in criminal trials, and the standard in capital cases must
be at least an order of magnitude higher than in other criminal
cases.5 There is nothing inherent in the criminal law that necessitates that it fall short of this daunting standard; in theory it is
achievable. Moreover, despite the stringently high standard of
accuracy the law demands in capital cases, these convictions are
subject to automatic review. Such are the lengths to which the
law goes, and rightly so, to prevent the taking of an innocent life.
Surely if the state intends to acquiesce in the taking of life, as is
proposed in the legalization of physician-assisted suicide, it must
demand at least this same high degree of accuracy to protect the
lives of those sick people whom it still deigns to include among
the objects of its interest.
That the standard of accuracy of prognosis must be this high
for a law proposing to legalize physician-assisted suicide may be
demonstrated by a simple a fortiori argument. Suppose that a
law were proposed that would deny voting rights to terminally ill
people. The theory behind such a law would be that the termi5. It is immeasurable, of course, how accurate the criminal justice system is in
practice. But the standard that criminal law sets as its goal is for all convictions to be
correct verdicts. That goal is so important, in fact, that the law allows there to be some
false acquittals in order to achieve this high rate of true convictions.
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nally ill are not going to be alive during the term of the elected
official, and therefore should have no say as to who that official
will be. Offended and outraged patients would bring suit against
the government that passed such laws, arguing, among other
things, that the great inaccuracy of prediction makes the law
arbitrary and unconstitutional. It is hard to imagine courts
which have already discarded limitations on the franchise based
on literacy, language, and poll tax would not be sympathetic to
such a claim, even if they accepted the theory underlying the
law. If the courts should demand a very high standard of prognostic accuracy for deprivation of the right to vote, a fortiori they
and we must demand an even higher standard to justify deprivation of the state's interest in preservation of life.
The most widely available and reproducible type of survival
statistic in medicine, median survival from the time of diagnosis,
is also the least useful for the purposes of physician-assisted suicide proponents. Median survival is the length of time it takes
for half a population to die. By definition, half the population
lives longer than its median survival. This datum is useful for
those wanting to improve the survival of the whole group since it
reflects the performance of the whole group. To adopt a median
survival of six months as the standard for application of physician-assisted suicide would, however, eliminate even the modicum of concern that proponents of euthanasia express for the
lives of sick patients. A median survival time of six months may
be seen, for example, with a disease that is curable 50% of the
time.
The mean survival time, again measured from the day of diagnosis, is no more useful than median survival for the dubious
purposes of physician-assisted suicide proponents. Mean survival is simply the average survival. Distribution curves of survival are, however, virtually never bell-shaped. The typical
heavy clustering of deaths early in the observed period throws
the mean survival time well beyond the median survival time. In
other words, a few long-term survivors greatly prolong the mean
survival. But if less than half of the group are long-term survivors, the median survival may remain quite brief. It is important to keep in mind that a good number of long-term survivors
and even cured patients live well beyond the mean survival time.
By their very definition, there are always patients who live
longer than both median and mean survival times.
Rather than median or mean survival time, the kind of estimate needed for this novel denial of civil rights 6 is maximum sur6.

That is, a class-based abandonment of state interest in maintaining life.
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vival time. Since this kind of statistic has little use in clinical
medicine, there is much less published research concerning these
statistics. The research available is well done, however, and worthy of close consideration.
IV.

PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS IN DEVELOPING AND APPLYING
MEDICAL STATISTICS

Lynn and some other authors have reviewed the problems in
applying aggregate statistics to individuals and identified five
elements central to helping physicians determine whether a
model developed to predict survival is applicable to a particular
patient.7 The first question that the clinician must ask is how
similar his or her patient is to the patients used to develop the
model. In practice, there are almost always major differences
between the two. If nothing else, the passage of time since the
study was conducted makes a major difference. The steady
improvement in supportive care, even if there has been no
improvement in disease-specific treatment, makes current
patients imperfectly comparable to those treated in the past.
Many published models are based on outcomes in academic medical settings, yet the majority of individuals treated in this country receive their care in community-based medical facilities. If
the model is based on a prospectively randomized clinical trial,
attention must be paid to the entry inclusion and exclusion criteria of that study, since the individual patient may not have qualified for entry into that study and hence would be a member of an
entirely different clinical population.
Often overlooked is the fact that clinical staging itself has
changed with progress in diagnostic techniques. More accurate
staging improves the outcome in all stages of illness even if the
treatment effects do not change. For example, improved diagnostic imaging techniques allow us to detect tiny metastases of cancer that would have gone undetected with older technology. The
patient in whom such metastases are discovered with the modern technology is diagnosed as having a higher stage disease
than the patient would have been if he or she had been evaluated
with the older technology. Obviously, patients who just barely
qualify as having advanced stage disease have a better prognosis
than those in whom metastases are large and multiple. Including these patients with previously undetectable metastases in
the worst prognostic group dilutes that group's poor prognosis
with patients who will likely do better than the previous average.
7. Joanne Lynn et al., Accurate Prognosticationsof Death-Opportunities and
Challenges for Clinicians,WEST J. MED. 250-57 (1995).
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The overall prognosis for that stage of the illness is thus
improved. Similarly, removing the patients with previously
undetectable metastases from the better prognosis group
improves the average prognosis of that group, since those
removed patients would have had a poorer than average outcome. Thus the mere shifting of patients from one stage to
another due to more accurate clinical staging improves the prognosis of all groups independent of any improvement in disease
treatment.8
Second, we must examine the pertinence of the study's end
point to the patient at hand. If application of physician-assisted
suicide depends on the likelihood of survival for six months, then
data from studies with end points at two months or twelve
months are clearly inapplicable. Another problem is that many
patients used in studies are lost to follow-up. As such, there is a
serious risk of unreliability in the study, no matter how the data
concerning the cases is handled. If, for statistical purposes, a
patient is assumed to have died at the last contact date, an inaccurately low mean survival time is likely to result. If the
patients lost to follow-up are simply censored from the data analysis, the resultant error is not eliminated, but its vector is
unknowable. Obviously, if patients are lost to follow-up because
they die, that has a tremendously different statistical implication
from their being lost to follow-up because their health improves
and they relocate.
The third question concerning the applicability of a published
survival study considers whether the predictor variables are well
chosen, of appropriate number, and reliably measured. For
example, some survival studies are based on "diagnosis-related
group" data generated for billing purposes during a hospitalization. Not only does such a study introduce a serious question
concerning accuracy of diagnosis, it assumes as a precondition
for study entry that the patient is sick enough to be hospitalized.
Patients well enough to be living at home may have a vastly different prognosis. Moreover, physiologic measurements, such as
nutritional status and performance status, may have a more
important impact on survival than does simple diagnosis or even
stage of illness.
If a study tests too many variables, the result might be
"overfitting." Such studies become more accurate in predicting
the outcome of fewer individuals. This is because the more vari8. This has been called the Okie effect, or Will Rogers effect, based on the quip by
Will Rogers that when the Okies moved to California, that raised the average IQ in both
states.
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ables measured in a study, the more patients are needed to make
that study reliable. 9
When studies are retrospective, information is often missing
from the original documents. Missing data are often assumed to
be normal for study purposes. Such an assumption is potentially
misleading, however, since many patients would have had abnormal data had they been measured. Moreover, the presence or
absence of certain data from the medical record is probably not a
random event. It may be that patients were either too sick for
the datum to matter-hence it was not measured--or too well
for the datum to be a concern. In either case, the data are not
missing for reasons that may be expected to be equally distributed across the whole study population.
In some studies, a predictor variable is used that is not present
in the individual patient. For various clinical reasons, it may be
impossible or unethical to measure that variable in the patient.
Depending on the weight given to that variable in the published
study, the data may be radically skewed in its applicability to the
individual.
The fourth question we must ask about survival models is how
the models' accuracy was quantified. This question has two
aspects. The first question concerns calibration of the model.
Calibration is the measurement of how well a model predicts survival over the entire range of the model. In a sense, calibration
refers to the average accuracy of the model. Only models of high
calibration are likely to be useful for predicting survival. The
second aspect to be considered in assessing a predictive model is
its discrimination. It is possible that the model is quite accurate
at predicting survival at certain points in time but not others.
For example, there may be a high correlation between predicted
and actual survival at one week, but far less correlation at six
months. If survival curves are used to predict survival at six
months, they must discriminate very well at that time period, no
matter what their overall calibration is.
Finally, and most importantly, we must ask of a survival
model whether it has been validated. Developing a mathematical formula from a given cohort of patients and examining how
that formula discriminates within that cohort concerning their
survival is quite different from taking that same mathematical
formula and applying it to a new population. The ability of a
model to predict survival in this second population is the key test
of a model's predictive value. Without such a test, a model is
9.

Frank E. Harrell, Jr. et al., Regression Modelling Strategiesfor Improved Prog-

nostic Prediction, 3

STATISTICS IN MEDICINE

143-52 (1984).
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little more than an untested theory with respect to its predictive
use.
There are certainly numerous published studies concerning
survival of cohorts of patients with different clinical problems.
Far fewer studies develop a model to predict survival of subjects
within the original population. Rarer still are studies that then
apply such a model prospectively to a new population, yet only
this last type of study may be considered as having even potential validity for the purposes that physician-assisted suicide supporters propose.
Finally, a word must be said concerning what may be the most
important persisting limitation on a predictive model, even one
that has met the daunting challenges outlined above. That is,
most of these models do not consider variations in treatment.
This is not because treatment has little effect on survival outcome, rather, it is because the predictions of survival are made
before the treatment is rendered. Survival models necessarily
assume "typical treatment" will be applied to the population. It
is difficult to see how treatment effects can routinely be used in
predictive survival models, since learning of one's prognosis
might influence a patient's decision to accept treatment, one way
or the other. It is even more difficult to believe that the treatment chosen is not, for better or worse, a significant prognostic
factor.

V.

FEEDBACK IMPACT OF PHYSICIAN-AsSISTED SUICIDE ON
VALIDITY OF PROGNOSTICATION

If physician-assisted suicide were legalized, the survival data
upon which treatment decisions are made will become further
skewed and less reliable due to a pernicious feedback phenomenon. As will be shown below, the best survival predictions still
err in about 15% of patients. The individuals to whom the statistics erroneously apply are impossible to predict. Presumably
some of the patients whom the doctors erroneously declare to
have less than six months to live will choose physician-assisted
suicide (or have it chosen for them by court-sanctioned substituted judgment). Thus, if physician-assisted suicide were legalized, the average survival of patients predicted to live less than
six months would be shortened by euthanasia itself. Much of the
physician-assisted suicide legislation stipulates that the cause of
death to be listed on the death certificate shall be the original
diagnosis rather than suicide or homicide. Thus, a second iteration of the predictive model even if it were repeated on the original population would find an increase in discrimination at six
months when compared to the original calculation. This appar-
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ent increase in the predictive value of the model is ironically due
to the fact that more patients truly destined to live beyond six
months had their lives shortened by euthanasia. This is the very
opposite of the goal of prognostication in this setting. Thus, the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide, eo ipso, would reduce
the already dubious validity of the very reed upon which it leans.
VI.

DEPRESSION, SUICIDE, PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE, AND
PROGNOSIS

The most likely setting in which the legalization of physicianassisted suicide would adversely affect prognosis and thereby
distort prognostic models is the case of depression. The terrible
prevalence of depression and suicide bears emphasis: the prevalence of major depression is between 5 and 20% in this country."°
Major depression is a serious risk factor for death by suicide. Fifteen percent of patients with recurrent depression die in that
tragic fashion." It should come as no surprise that patients with
serious illness are at increased risk of major depression. Almost
one fifth of patients hospitalized because of coronary artery disease are clinically depressed. Among cancer patients the prevalence is 20 to 42%. Depression is also frequently seen as a
complication of central nervous system diseases, 1 2 such as multiple sclerosis, stroke, Alzheimer's disease, and Parkinson's
disease.'

3

Unfortunately, although depression is more common among
the serious ill than in the population at large, the diagnosis of
depression is often missed in the setting of advanced illness. All
too often physicians confuse depression for grief, or believe that
depression is "normal" in the seriously ill. This is tragic, because
the seriously ill patient with depression benefits as much from
drug therapy as does a somatically well patient.
A depressed patient usually does not meet the legal criterion of
mental incompetence. Depression is a mood disorder, not a
thought disorder. Thus, a depressed patient, even a suicidal one,
may be held in a psychiatric treatment facility involuntarily for
only a few days. In the long run, a depressed patient's reception
of treatment requires informed consent. A suicidal patient who
10. Darrel A. Regier et al., One-Month Prevalence of Mental Disorders in The
United States, ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 477-86 (1988).
11. S.B. Guze & E. Robins, Suicide and Primary Affective Disorders, 117 BRrr. J.
PSYCHIATRY 437-438 (1970).
12. There is little wonder that so many patients with chronic neurologic disorders
may be found on the list of those who have died "in the presence of' Jack Kevorkian.
ic AmmcAN
13. S.E. Hyman et al, Mood and Anxiety Disorders, in SciEN
MEDICINE § 13 (D.C. Dale and D.D.Federman eds., 1995).
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refuses treatment for depression, or who is never offered such
treatment, is at high risk of completing suicide. Those depressed
patients who sincerely profess the intention to kill themselves
and who do not receive treatment have a significant risk of dying,
and some clinicians might reasonably predict many such
patients as being unlikely to survive as long as six months.
Ironically, the legalization of physician-assisted suicide would
place physicians and patients in a terrible dilemma. The law
requires the doctor to obtain a patient's informed consent for
treatment. Such consent is not valid unless the physician has
informed the patient about the potential risks, benefits, and
alternatives to the proposed course of therapy. If the patient
expresses willingness to accept therapy of his depression, ipso
facto his or her prognosis improves, and the doctor therefore need
not bring up the subject of physician assistance in the suicide.
On the other hand, if the patient expresses initial refusal or even
reluctance to accept the medical therapy of depression, his or her
prognosis considerably worsens, and in some cases worsens sufficiently to lead the doctor to conclude the patient is unlikely to
survive six months. Such a conclusion triggers the doctor's duty
to explain the alternative "treatment" for which the patient then
qualifies. Rather than trying to prevent the suicide, in the most
difficult cases the physician has a duty to inform the patient that
he or she may legally seek a physician's assistance in performing
it! Of course this offer of assistance in suicide, coming from an
authority figure such as a physician, will only increase the likelihood of completed suicide. Thus the very people at greatest risk
of this fatal complication of depression are the ones most likely to
die as a result of legalized physician-assisted suicide. Such are
its tender mercies!
Above all others, hopelessness is that aspect of depression
most highly correlated with suicide. 14 Among hospitalized medically ill patients, a loss of rapport between hospital staff and
patient is the most significant sign of impending suicide. 15 The
legalization of physician-assisted suicide would pervert the therapeutic liaison between depressed patient and physician.
Patients most at risk of suicide because of hopelessness would
have their desperation worsened by the physician's grim prognosis. Patients most in need of a physician to counsel hope and

14.
(1975).

Aaron T. Beck et al.,
Hopelessness and SuicidalBehavior, 234 JAMA 1146-49

15. Peter Reich & M.J. Kelly, Suicide Attempts by Hospitalized Medical and Surgical Patients, NEW ENG. J. MED. 298-301 (1976).
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therapy would feel and be betrayed by a doctor offering help in
killing them.
Thus, legalization of physician-assisted suicide would create a
pernicious positive feedback loop; that is, the patients with the
worst prognoses would be most likely to have their prognoses
worsened. The increased case fatality rate among patients with
suicidal depression would lead, on further iteration of statistical
analysis, to a progressively worse prognosis for the group as a
whole. This, in turn, would justify new rounds of grim prognoses
and grim reapers.
The promise by physician-assisted suicide proponents that
depressed patients will be excluded from their dubious anodyne
gives little comfort. Certainly, those court rulings that find physician-assisted suicide to be a constitutionally protected right,
whether due to a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" interest' or
Equal Protection Clause 17 , seem to allow little room for protection of this population. The disabled, even the mentally disabled,
have the same recourse to constitutional rights as do other citizens. Again, the suicidal depressed patient is mentally competent under the law, and there are no legitimate grounds by which
the patient's constitutional rights may be diminished.
Even if physician-assisted suicide is enacted through the legislative process, explicitly excluding depressed persons, there is little reason to think these paper barriers will long endure.
Certainly, for reasons cited above, exclusion of depressed
patients from physician-assisted suicide is unlikely to withstand
challenge on constitutional grounds. Equally as important, the
widespread failure of doctors to recognize and treat depression in
the severely ill would lead to a de facto inclusion of numerous
depressed patients among those whose lives end at their doctors'
hands. Indeed, clinical experience suggests that a majority of
those people dying of physician-assisted suicide would be
depressed. The reason is that most terminally ill patients
expressing a serious and pervasive desire to die are in fact clinically depressed.' 8 Moreover, the precedent established in a foreign jurisdiction, where a doctor could subject a healthy

16. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1996), en banc,
cert. granted, Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96110).
17. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996), cert.granted, Vacco v. Quill, 65
U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858).
18. Harvey Max Chochinov et al., Desirefor Death in the Terminally Ill, 152 AM. J.
PsYCHIATRY 1185-91 (1995).

1996

The Limits of Prognostication

349

depressed patient to physician-assisted suicide with impunity, is
frightening, to say the least. 19
VII.

EMPIRICAL LIMITS OF PROGNOSTICATION

In science, only the voice of data is authoritative. The published studies concerning reliability of life expectancy prediction
do not support the assumption of physician-assisted suicide proponents that such predictions can be made with requisite reliability. A number of studies employing a variety of techniques all
point to this same conclusion.
Parkes presented one of the earliest studies apposite to our
question. 20 His study population included patients admitted to
the world-renowned St. Christopher's Hospice in London. Referring physicians were asked to predict the life expectancy, in
weeks, of admitted patients. The same question was asked of
experienced medical and nursing staff of the hospice. In nearly
three-fourths of the referred cases, the referring doctor was
unwilling to commit to a precise prediction. In the remaining
cases, presumably thought by the doctors to be easier to predict,
the patients lived longer than predicted in 26% of the cases. In
7% of the cases predicted by the referring physician, the patient
lived more than twice as long as the doctor had predicted. The
predictions by the hospice admitting physicians were not significantly better or worse than the predictions made by general practitioners, physicians at other hospitals, or senior nursing staff.
A similar study was conducted in the United States by Forster
and Lynn. 2 ' In the part of their study pertinent to our question,
the life expectancy of 108 applicants to an in-patient hospice was
predicted by five different people: a consulting university oncologist, a board-certified general internist, a hospice social worker, a
board-certified community oncologist, and a registered nurse. A
prediction was scored as "seriously pessimistic" if the prognosis
was for less than three months, but actual survival was twice as
long. Five percent of the prognoses met this criterion of seriously
pessimistic. If the predictions of the community oncologist,
whose prognoses were "seriously optimistic" 22 36% of the time,
19. Alan D. Ogilvie & S.G. Potts, Assisted Suicide for Depression: The Slippery
Slope in Action, 309 Barr. MED. J. 492-93 (1994).
20. C. Murray Parkes, Accuracy of Predictions of Survival in Later Stages of Cancer, 2 Barr. MED. J. 29-31 (1972).
21. Lorna Earl Forster & J. Lynn, PredictingLife Span for Applicants to Inpatient
Hospice, 148 ARcH. INT. MED. 2540-43 (1988).

22. A seriously optimistic prognosis was defined as one in which the prediction was
survival greater than six months, but the patient lived fewer than three months.
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were excluded from the study the percentage of errors deemed
seriously pessimistic would have been even higher.
Predictions using a cut-off of one month survival seem to be no
better than the ones based on three or six months. In a prospective study conducted at the Edmonton General Hospital in Canada, Bruera and some other authors predicted the survival of 61
consecutive patients admitted to the Palliative Care Unit for terminal care.2 Life expectancy of either less than or greater than
four weeks was made by two different physicians, both expert in
the management of patients with advanced cancer. Fourteen of
the patients were not evaluable. Among the remaining fortyseven patients, one doctor predicted a life expectancy less than
four weeks in thirty-three of them. The doctor erred in this prediction 60% of the time, however. The other doctor predicted survival less than four weeks in twenty-five patients. That doctor's
error rate was 64%.
It might be thought that a predictive model based on objectively measurable predictors would be more accurate than the
gestalt-based prediction of even skilled personnel. In fact, however, an objectively based model fared no better, and arguably
was worse than the predictions of skilled observers in this setting. Using the same data base as in the above-cited study, Forster and Lynn developed a logistic regression model to predict
death within three or six months.24 It is important to note that
this model was then applied to the same patient population, not
to a new one. Thus, the model is untested for any population
other than these one hundred and eight patients, and the accuracy of these results is therefore the maximum this model can
hope to attain. Fourteen objectively measured risk factors were
considered in the model. Among the patients whom the model
predicted to live less than three months, 10% lived longer.
Among those whom the model predicted to live less than six
months, 5% lived longer.
To make matters even less reliable, prognostic factors identified as being well-correlated with survival in one study do not
seem to be so in others. For example, Rosenthal along with some
other individuals assessed nineteen parameters potentially associated with survival in hospice patients.25 Only four of these risk
23.

Eduardo Bruera et al., Estimate of Survival of PatientsAdmitted to a Palliative

are Unit: A Prospective Study, 7 J. OF PAIN AND SYMPrOM MGMT. 82-86 (1992).

24. Loran Earl Forster & J. Lynn, The Use of Physiologic Measures and Demographic Variables to PredictLongevity Among InpatientHospice Applicants, AM. J. HosPiCE CARE, March/April 1989, at 31-34.
25. MA. Rosenthal et al., Predictionof Life-Expectancy in Hospice Patients: Identification of Novel Prognostic Factors, 7 PALLIATIVE MED. 199-204 (1994).
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factors proved to be associated with survival. Three of these factors had not been identified in prior studies. More importantly,
the study found no association between their patients' survival
and four putative predictors identified in these other studies.
Thus, the cross-study reliability of many risk factors for survival
of terminally ill patients is not well established.
The largest study concerning reliability of prognoses is the
very recent one presented by Christakis and Escarce in which
they studied the actual survival time of 6451 patients who had
enrolled in the Hospice Medicare program. 26 In order for a Medicare beneficiary to be eligible for this program, both the patient's
referring physician and the hospice medical director have to certify that the patient is "terminally ill," i.e. has a life expectancy of
six months or less. The authors found that 15% of the patients
were still alive after the time predicted by their doctors. In fact,
8% of the patients were still alive at the end of a year.2 7 This
inaccuracy of prognosis was not evenly distributed across the
whole study population. The referring physician and medical
director were particularly likely to make "pessimistic errors"
with demented patients. Over a third of them lived beyond the
predicted six months.
Adding a third doctor to the prognosticating team does not
dramatically improve the accuracy, certainly not to the level of
accuracy that legalized physician-assisted suicide would require.
Allard and other authors presented data concerning 1081 terminally ill cancer patients admitted to a palliative care center in
Quebec. 28 As the authors noted, priority for admission into the
center was given to terminally ill cancer patients for whom life
expectancy was considered to be shorter than two months. The
estimate of life expectancy was made by a three-member medical
panel, and was based on "an extensive review of all available
data on cancer staging and progression, and on an extensive
clinical assessment made by experienced palliative care nurses."
Despite this stringency of entrance criteria, 9% of the patients
exceeded the survival time predicted by this experienced medical
team.
It will be noted that there is significant variability in the accuracy of physicians' prognoses as seen in these studies. At best,
when the error rate approaches single digits, the accuracy rate is
26. Nicholas A. Christakis & J.J. Escarce, Survival of Medicare Patients After
Enrollment in Hospice Programs, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 172-78 (1996).
27. Id. Christakis and Escarce do not report what percentage of the doctors had
died during this time. Id.
28. P. Allard et al., FactorsAssociated With Length of Survival Among 1081 Terminally Ill CancerPatients, 11 J. PALtuTrvE CARE 20-24 (1995).
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adequate for legitimate medical purposes, but even then it comes
nowhere close to matching the high standard of accuracy that
physician-assisted suicide would require. To predicate physician-assisted suicide on physicians' ability to predict life expectancy with very high degrees of accuracy is to build a house on
sand - its foundation gives no support.
VIII. THEORETICAL LIMITS OF PROGNOSTICATION
The research cited above demonstrates that empirical studies
have not shown an accuracy sufficient for the needs of legalized
physician-assisted suicide. The question arises: Could other
studies, using other methods, achieve a level of accuracy substantially greater than these? The answer is no.
Human survival must be either stochastic or determinative or
a mixture of the two. A stochastic function is non-determinative, although the probability of an event is not necessarily
equally distributed across time. "Stochastic" is simply another
way of saying "things just happen." Most medical experimentation involving survival time assumes that the percentage of the
population surviving at any given time reflects the operation of
underlying stochastic processes. By definition, stochastic events
are non-determinative. Obviously, individual non-determinative
events cannot be predicted with a high degree of accuracy,
although aggregates of such events may be described. If survival
of terminally ill patients is stochastic, then there is a theoretical
limit of prognostic accuracy that cannot be breached, no matter
how clever the researchers and their predictive models.
Even if human survival is completely determinative, it is quite
likely that the dynamics of chaos theory apply to it. "Chaos," as
used here, does not mean the tohubohu that preceded the creation described in Genesis. Rather, it is a fairly new branch of
mathematics and mechanics that deals with determinative systems that exhibit apparently random or unpredictable behavior.
A common element in these systems is a very high degree of sensitivity to initial conditions and to the way in which they are set
in motion. Very small changes in these initial conditions can
lead to enormous changes in the outcome. For example, whether
one is stopped by a given red traffic light can have a huge impact
on the events one will experience later in the day, or even for the
rest of one's life. This exquisite sensitivity to initial conditions
has been called the "butterfly effect," after meteorologist Edward
Lorenz's euphonious speculation that the flap of a butterfly's
wings in Brazil might set off a tornado in Texas.
Human survival would seem to be a reasonable application of
chaos theory. We assume that our health tomorrow will be a con-
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sequence of the state of our bodies and the forces applied to them
today. For cancer patients, it is reasonable to assume that the
current location, number, and growth rate of their tumors, as
well as the patient's nutrition, immune function, and comorbidities will determine their overall health tomorrow, just as
tomorrow's status of these variables will determine how they
align the next day. Perhaps we should use chaos theory rather
than stochastic models to analyze survival time of terminally ill
people, and perhaps such analysis would yield more accurate
predictions in individual cases.
In fact, early forays into medical prognostication, using chaos
theory, have already been made. Determinative chaotic models
can be created that fit the data derived from cancer survival
studies and contagious disease epidemic data.2 Such chaotic
models may well yield new insights into the implications of negative and positive clinical trials, but they contain assumptions
that make them inapplicable to individual prognostication. For
example, a very large number of independent variables must be
assumed in these models, and each of them must be measured
nearly simultaneously with a near-perfect degree of accuracy.
Significantly, the models do not assume any probability of impact
of the measurement per se on the function measured nor on other
functions, an omission that is contrary to all clinical experience.
Not only would all these measurements have to be made on the
patient, but the current and future status of all who might
encounter the patient, either to succor or inadvertently infect
him or her, must be considered in the chaotic models. Chaos theory, obviously, may be useful in refining understanding of aggregate behavior, but cannot be applied to individual patients to
predict survival time.
Thus, whether survival be stochastic or chaotic, even in theory
we cannot predict an individual's survival with accuracy adequate for the needs of physician-assisted suicide.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Proposals that limit physician-assisted suicide to terminally ill
patients are based on the false assumption that such patients
can be identified with a fair degree of precision. Highly accurate
predictive models of survival are difficult to create, harder to
apply, scanty in number, flawed in practice, and impossible in
29. M.C. Mackey & J.G. Milton, A DeterministicApproach to Survival Statistics,
28 J. MATHEmATICAL BiLOGY 33-48 (1990); G. Sugihara & R.M. May, NonlinearForecasting As a Way of Distinguishing Chaos From Measurement Error in Time Series, 344
NATURE 734-41 (1990).
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theory. Not only is the proposed law thus predicated on a chimera, the attempted application of the law would increase the
error upon which it is based. If physician-assisted suicide were
legalized, an increasing number of people who are not truly terminally ill (absent such laws) would become so by the law's very
enactment. The infamous slippery slope is thus mathematically
demonstrable in this microcosm, just as it is sociologically predictable in the macrocosm of public policy.
When adverse consequences of public policy are inadvertent,
the authors of the policy may be criticized for lack of foresight or
wisdom. When the adverse consequences are unavoidable and
predictable, and all the more so when they are predicted and
demonstrably inevitable, then the authors of such policy merit a
far greater criticism. How more contemnible yet must be the
proposed legalization of physician-assisted suicide, whose
excesses and abuses are not simply theoretical. They are already
tragically manifest, both in the Netherlands, and in Michigan in
the dubious career of the nation's most notorious serial mercy
killer. Legalization of physician-assisted suicide would result
not only in the state-sanctioned killing of terminally ill people, it
would also lead to the killing of increasing numbers of non-terminally ill people-the misdiagnosed, the misprognosed, the misfashioned, and the misunderstood. Only a state indifferent to
such an outcome would allow such legalization. Such a state, no
less than our matriarch in ParadiseLost, would truly be "defac't,
deflourd, and now to Death devote."

